Abstract. This paper examines infinity and self-reference from a critique perspective. Starting from an extension of Cantor Paradox that suggests the inconsistency of the actual infinite, the paper makes a short review of the controversial history of infinity and suggests several indicators of its inconsistency. Semantic self-reference is also examined from the same critique perspective by comparing it with self-referent sets. The platonic scenario of infinity and selfreference is finally criticized from a biological and neurobiological perspective.
Introduction
The most relevant problems of contemporary philosophy were already posed by Presocratic thinkers as early as the VII century b.C. (some of them perhaps suggested or directly taken from the cultural precedents developed in the Neolithic Fluvial Cultures [16] , [147] , [123] , [161] ). Three among those problems deserves special consideration: the problem of change; infinity; and self-reference. The first one is surely the most difficult problem ever posed by man. For that reason, it surprises the little attention we currently pay to such a challenging question, specially when compared to the attention we pay to the other two. After more than twenty seven centuries, the problem of change remains unsolved (for a general background see [117] ). In spite of its apparent obviousness, no one has been capable of explaining how one leaves a place to occupy another. The science of change -physics-seems to have forgotten its most fundamental problem. In their turn, some philosophers from Hegel declared it as an inconsistent process! [78] , [80] , [110] , [125] , [136] , [169] , while others, as McTaggart, came to the same conclusion as Parmenides on the impossibility of change [109] .
Contrarily to the problem of change, which has an immediate reflection in the agitated evolution of the Universe, both infinity and self-reference are pure theoretical devices without reflection in the natural world. Cantor and Gödel (the princes of infinity and self-reference respectively) were two platonic fundamentalists of scarce devotion to natural sciences and enormous influence in contemporary mathematics (for the case of Cantor see [44] , [112] , [33, pag. 141] ; for that of Gödel [66, pags. 235-236] , [67, pag. 359] , [46] [118] , [68] ). Twenty seven centuries of discussions were not sufficient to prove the consistency of the actual infinity, which finally had to be legitimated by the expeditious way of axioms. Although the consistency of self-reference has been less discussed, the paradoxes it originates have been, and continue to be, the source of interminable discussions. One of them, the Liar Paradox, became (via Richard Paradox) the first of the two celebrated Gödel's incompleteness theorems 1 [64] . Infinity and self-reference may be two of the most important obstructions in the history of human thought. Obstructions that may have been driving our attention, effort and resources in the wrong way if what we pretend is to explain the physical world our lives evolve in. The scarce (frequently null) naturalist education of mathematicians as well as the scarce mathematical education of naturalists perhaps explain because we have come so far in both affairs.
Paradoxes and inconsistencies
It is paradoxical that formal literature be not more exigent in the use of the term 'paradox,' frequently used in the place of 'contradiction' or 'inconsistency.' When, for instance, we write:
we say H is inconsistent because it is the immediate cause of contradiction (c ∧ ¬c). But when the cause of the contradiction is not so immediate and well known it is relatively frequent to use the term paradox instead of contradiction. When, finally, we write a self-referent proposition as: p = p is false (2) we have on the one hand, and according to the Principle of Identity:
and on the other, and according to the own proposition p:
Whence: p ⇒ (p ∧ ¬p) (5) In these cases we invariably use the term 'paradox' instead of 'contradiction' (in this case the celebrated 'if p then not p' and 'if not p then p').
1
In secondary literature, the first Gödel's incompleteness theorem is invariably presented in a dishonest way. The reader get the idea that in every formal system there are true propositions which are undemonstrable. Gödel actually proved the existence of one proposition which is both true and undemonstrable; but that proposition is a very very special one: it is a self-referent proposition. One that, conveniently interpreted, says of itself that it is undemonstrable in a certain formal calculus. Something like: this proposition is undemonstrable
The paradoxes of Set Theory we will examine here are surely inconsistencies derived from both the actual infinity and self-reference. As is well known, Burali-Forti made use of his famous paradox as an inconsistency to prove that the law of trichotomy does not hold for all transfinite ordinals [25] . In his turn, Cantor did not hesitate in using the expression 'inconsistent totalities' (letter to Dedekind quoted in [44, pag. 245] ) to refer to certain sets we will immediately deal with. In any case, it is not the purpose of this work to state when and how we should use the terms paradox and inconsistency or contradiction. In this sense we will be so informal as the formal literature related to mathematical formalism.
Extending Cantor Paradox
Although Burali-Forti was the first in publishing an inconsistency related to transfinite sets [24] , [62] , Cantor was the first to discover a paradox in the nascent set theory: I am referring to the maximum cardinal paradox [62] , [44] . There is no agreement regarding the date Cantor discovered his paradox [62] (the proposed dates range from 1883 [135] to 1896 [70] ). Burali-Forti Paradox on the set of all ordinals and Cantor Paradox on the set of all cardinals are both related to the size of the considered totalities 2 , perhaps too big as to be consistent. From an infinitist perspective it results ironic that a set may be inconsistent just because of its excessive size. One can be infinite but only within certain limits.
A common way of presenting Cantor Paradox is as follows: Let U be the set of all sets, the so called universal set 3 and P (U) its power set, the set of all its subsets. As Cantor did, let us denote by U and P (U) their respective cardinals. Being U the set of all sets, we can write:
On the other hand, and according to Cantor theorem on the power set [29] , it holds:
which contradicts (6) . This is the famous Cantor inconsistency or paradox. As is well known, Cantor gave no importance to it [59] and solved the question by assuming the existence of two types of infinite totalities, the consistent and the inconsistent ones [28] . In Cantor opinion, the inconsistency of the lasts would surely due to their excessive size.
We would be in the face of the mother of all infinities, the absolute infinity which directly leads to God [28] . As we will immediately see, it is possible to extend Cantor Paradox to other sets much more modest than the universal set. But neither Cantor nor his successors considered such a possibility. We will do it here. This is just the objective of the discussion that follows. A discussion that will take place within the context of Cantor set theory (naive set theory), although with some side effects on modern axiomatic set theories.
We begin by considering a set X such that X = C > 1. From X we define set T X as:
Id est, T X contains as elements all subsets of set X; in addition, if Y is a subset of T X , its power set P (Y ) is also a subset of T X . We will see now that T X is an inconsistent totality. For this, let A be any proper nonempty subset of X. From A we define set T A in accordance with:
T A is, therefore, the set of all elements of set T X that do not contain as subset the subset A of X. T A is then a subset of T X . Consequently, and according to (8) , its power set P (T A ) is also a subset of T X . Therefore the elements of set P (T A ) are also elements of T X . Moreover, it is clair that:
In consequence all elements of set P (T A ) satisfy definition (9) . So, them all belong to T A . We have therefore a similar situation to that of Cantor Paradox. On the one hand and taking into account that T A contains all elements of P (T A ) we will have
On the other and according to Cantor theorem it must hold:
Again a contradiction. And then the totalities T A and T X from which it arises must be inconsistent. But X is any set of any cardinal C > 1 and A any one of its nonempty proper subsets. We can therefore state that every set of cardinal C gives rise to at least 2 C − 2 inconsistent totalities.
The above argument not only proves the number of inconsistent totalities is inconceivable greater than the number of consistent ones, it also suggests the excessive size of the sets could not be the cause of the inconsistency. In fact, consider, for instance, the set X = {1, 2}; according to the above argument, the totality T {1,2} defined in accordance with (8) is also inconsistent. But compared to the universal set it is an insignificant totality: it lacks of practically all sets of numerical content 4 or related to numbers (integers, rationals, reals, complexes, hiperreals, etc.); and all of non numerical content. T {1,2} is in fact an insignificant subset of the universal set, it lacks of almost all its elements. But it is also inconsistent. What both sets have in common, from the infinitist perspective, is that they are complete infinite totalities; i.e. totalities whose infinitely many elements exist all at once.
Had we know the existence of so many inconsistent infinite totalities, and not necessarily so greater as the absolute infinity, and perhaps Cantor transfinite set theory would have been received in a different way. Perhaps the very notion of actual infinity would have been put into question; and perhaps we would have discovered the way of proving its inconsistency: just the ω-order (see below). But this was not the case. The history of the reception of set theory and the way of dealing with its inconsistencies -all of them promoted by the actual infinity and self-reference-is well known. From the beginnings of the XX century a great effort have been carried out to found set theory on a consistent background free of inconsistencies. Although the objective could only be reached with the aid of the appropriate axiomatic parching. At least half a dozen axiomatic set theories have been developed ever since 5 [84] . Some hundred pages are needed to explain all axioms of contemporary axiomatic set theories. Just the contrary one expects on the foundations of a formal science as mathematics.
Criticism of the actual infinity
The history of infinity is one of a long and interminable controversy between its supporters and opponents. A controversy in which one of the alternatives always dominated on the other, although the dominant alternative was not always the same. Fortunately we dispose of an excellent and abundant literature on the history of infinity and its controversies (see for instance: [178] , [101] , [149] , [18] , [141] , [39] , [94] , [113] , [116] , [89] , [90] , [1] , [114] , [38] , [170] etc.). Here we will limit ourselves to recall the most significant details of that history, from Zeno of Elea to the actual paradise. Apart from the absolute hegemony of infinitism (supporters of the actual infinity) in contemporary mathematics, it surprises the lack of critical attitudes towards the actual infinity, even among its opponents (finitists). And that in spite of the paradoxes and extravagances its assumption gives rise, not to say its cognitive sterility in experimental sciences or the tremendous difficulties it poses in certain areas of physics (as renormalization in physics of elementary particles).
As is well known, the history of infinity begins with Zeno of Elea and his famous paradoxes. Although we know nothing on the true Zeno's intentions, surely more related to the problem of Change 6 than to the mathematical infinity. Scarcely 300 words from the original Zeno's texts have survive until the present [16] . It is by his doxographers 7 that we know Zeno's original works. Thus it seems proved he written a book with more than forty arguments in defense of Parmenides' thesis. We also know the book was available in Plato Academy and that it was read by the young Aristotle [40] . By way of example consider the reader to following original Zeno's argument ( [16, pag. 177] 
What moves, don't move neither in the place it is nor in that it is not.
It seems impossible to say more with so few words. The famous race between Achilles and the tortoise and Achilles passing over the so called [168] Z-points 8 (Dichotomy I) and Z * -points 9 (Dichotomy II) posed very difficult problems in which the actual infinity was already involved [144] , [114] , [106] . Aristotle suggested a solution to both dichotomies: the one to one correspondence between the successive Z-points (or Z * -points) and the successive instants at which Achilles passes over them [9] . But Aristotle was not convinced of his own solution and suggested another radically different one: the consideration of two types of infinities, namely the actual and the potential infinity. According to the first, infinite totalities would be complete totalities. In accordance with the second, infinite totalities would always be incomplete so that the only complete totalities would be the finite totalities. As is well known, Aristotle preferred the second type of infinitude, the potential infinity. And until the ends of the XIX century that was the dominant alternative on the infinity, although the other always maintained an active affiliation. In its turn, Zeno's Paradoxes still remains unsolved, in spite of certain proposed solutions and pseudo-solutions 10 6 Both Parmenides and his pupil Zeno defended the impossibility of change with many convincing arguments.
7 Among them Plato [127] , Aristotle [9] and Simplicius [152] . 8 The ω-ordered sequence of points 1/2, 3/4, 7/8, 15/16, . . . Achilles traverses in his race from point 0 to 1. 9 The ω * -ordered sequence of points . . . , 1/16, 1/8, 1/4, 1/2 Achilles traverses in his race from point 0 to 1.
10 Most of those solutions needed the development of new areas of mathematics, as Cantor's transfinite arithmetics, topology, or measure theory [73] , [74] , [176] , [75] , [77] , [76] , and more recently internal set theory [108] , [107] . It is also remarkable the solutions posed by P. Lynds in the framework of quantum mechanics [97] , [98] . Some of those solutions, however, have been seriously contested [124] , [3] , and in most cases the proposed solutions do not explain where Zeno arguments fail [124] , [133] . In addition, the proposed solution have given rise to new problems so exciting as Zeno's original ones [144] , [86] [150] .
Galileo famous paradox
11 on the natural numbers and their squares [61] introduced a significant novelty in the controversy on the mathematical infinity: the properties of infinite numbers could be different from those of the finite numbers. That is at least the only explanation Galileo found to the paradoxical fact that existing more natural numbers than perfect squares both sets can be put into a one to one correspondence (f (n) = n 2 , ∀n ∈ N). In fact, Galileo paradox only arises if both sets are considered as complete totalities (hypothesis of the actual infinity). From the perspective of the potential infinite Galileo paradox don't arise because from that perspective both sets are incomplete totalities so that we can only pair finite totalities of each one of them, finite totalities with the same number of elements. As large as we wish but always finite and incomplete. If in the place of the perfect squares Galileo would had considered the expofactorials perhaps he would not have come to the same conclusion. The expofactorial of a number n, written as n ! , is the factorial n! raised n! times to the power of n!. So, while the expofactorial of 2 is 16, the expofactorial of 3 is:
6 6 6 6 6 6 = 6 6 6 6 6 46656 = 6
where the incomplete exponent of the last expression has nothing less than 36306 digits (roughly ten pages of standard text). Modest 3 ! is a number so large that no modern (nor presumably future) computer can calculate it. Imagine, for instance 100
! . The set E of expofactorials lacks of practically all natural numbers and, however, can also be put into a one to one correspondence with the set of natural numbers (through the bijection f (n) = n ! ). Naturally, there is no problem in pairing off the firsts n natural numbers with the firsts n expofactorials, being the n-th expofactorial inconceivably greater than the n-th natural. Other thing is to claim that both sets exist as complete totalities with the same number of elements. And things may get worse with hyperfactorials, being the hyperfactorial of n, denoted by n !! , the expofactorial n ! raised n ! times to the power of n ! . Or ultrafactorials, being the ultrafactorial of n, denoted by n !!! the hyperfactorial n !! raised n !! times to the power of n !! . . . The Euclidean Axiom of the Whole and the Part 12 controlled the infinitist impulses of authors as al-Harrani [96] , Leibniz 13 [91] or Bolzano 11 Un example of the so called paradoxes of reflexivity, in which a whole is put into a one to one correspondence with one of its proper parts [149] , [50] . This type of paradoxes had already posed by many other authors as Proclus, J. Filopón, Thabit ibn Qurra al-Harani, R. Grosseteste, G. de Rimini, G. de Ockham etc. [149] .
12 "The whole is greater than the part". Common Notion 5. Book 1 of Euclid's Elements [57] 13 Leibniz position on the infinity is more ambiguous [114] , [10] than could be expected from his famous declaration of supporter of the actual infinity [91, pag. 416] [22] . Among the most famous bijections (one to one correspondences) between a whole and one of its parts are the classical ones defined by Bolzano between a real interval and one of its proper subintervals. In spite of which, Bolzano did not believe they were a sufficient condition to prove the equipotence of the paired intervals. [21, §22, 33, translated from [149] ]. Dedekind took the next step by assuming that exhaustive injections (bijections or one to one correspondences) were in fact a sufficient condition to prove equipotence. This implies to assume that two sets have the same number of elements if they can be put into a one to one correspondence. Or in other words, if after pairing every element of a set B with a different element of a set A, no element of A results unpaired (exhaustive injection), then sets A and B have the same number of elements. This is a reasonable assumption. But it is also reasonable to assume that if after pairing every element of a set B with a different element of a set A, one or more elements of A remains unpaired (non-exhaustive injection), then A and B have not the same number of elements. We are then faced with a dilemma: if exhaustive injections and non-exhaustive injections have or not the same level of conclusiveness when used as instruments to compare the number of elements of two infinite sets. If they have, then the actual infinity is inconsistent because in these conditions it can be proved that an infinite set have (exhaustive injection) and does not have (non-exhaustive injection) the same number of elements as one of its proper subsets 14 . There is no reason to assume that non-exhaustive injections are less relevant than exhaustive ones to state if two sets have, or not, the same number of elements. Thus modern infinitism should explicitly declare, by an appropriate ad hoc axiom, a new singularity of infinite sets, namely that the number of their elements cannot be compared by means of non-exhaustive injections. But, as is well known, no step has been taken in this direction. On the contrary, infinitists define infinite set just as those that can be put into an exhaustive and injective correspondence with one of its proper subsets, ignoring that this subset can also be put into a non-exhaustive and injective correspondence with the infinite set. As Dedekind proposed, infinitist definition of infinite sets is entirely based on the violation of the old Euclidean Axiom of the Whole and the Part. And committed the violation, the infinitist orgy don't make us wait: Cantor inaugurated the actual infinitist paradise just at the end of the XIX century. Paradise that for others authors as Brouwer, Poincaré o Wittgenstein, was rather a nightmare, a malady or even a joke. Thus, from the beginning of the XX century, infinitism become absolutely dominant in mathematics. Although finitist has not disappeared its presence in contemporary mathematics is almost irrelevant. In addition, the critique of infinity is practically non-existent and the scarce efforts carried out have been systematically rejected in behalf of the supposed differences between the infinite and the finite numbers (see for instance [142] ).
At the beginning of the XXI century a new way of criticism has been opened. It is based on the notion of ω-order, a formal consequence of the actual infinity as Cantor himself proved [32, pags. [110] [111] [112] [113] [114] [115] [116] [117] [118] . Although the new way of criticism has its roots in certain discussions that took place at the beginning of the second half of the XX century. In fact, in the year 1954 J. F. Thomson introduced the term supertask 15 in a famous argument regarding a lamp that is turned on and off infinitely many times. Thomson defended the impossibility of performing such a supertask [166] . His argument was motivated for other similar arguments defended by M. Black with its infinite machines [19] , and criticized by R. Taylor [165] and J. Watling [171] . The argument of Thomson lamp was in turn severally criticized by P. Benacerraf [15] , and that criticism gave rise to a new infinitist theory at the end of the XX century: supertask theory (see, for instance, [23] , [37] , [133] ). In the last years supertask theory has extended its theoretical scenario to the physical world. The possibility of actually performing certain supertask have been discussed ( [126] , [129] , [133] , [144] , [75] [132] , [122] , [4] , [5] , [134] [172], [83] , [53] , [54] , [122] , [52] , [150] . As could be expected the performance of such supertasks would imply the most extravagant pathologies in the physical world, both newtonian and relativist. But what really surprises is that in the place of considering such unbelievable pathologies as clair indicatives of the inconsistency of supertasks (and then of the actual infinity), its defenders prefer to accept those pathologies before questioning the consistency of the actual infinity.
As is well known, a set is ω-ordered if it has a first element and every element has an immediate successor and an immediate predecessor (except the first one). The set N of natural number with its natural order of precedence is a clair example of ω-ordered set. From the point of view of the actual infinity, an ω-ordered set is a complete totality, although no last element completes it. Thus an ω-ordered list is one that is simultaneously complete (as the actual infinity requires) and uncompletable (because no last element completes it). The existence of lists that are simultaneously complete and uncompletable is another inevitable extravagance of the actual infinity, although in this case it is less known than others (perhaps because being simultaneously complete and uncompletable seems contradictory even for infinitists). Still less known is the following asymmetry also derived from ω-order. Imagine a straight line segment of 30000 millions light-years (within the scale of the supposed size of the Universe) and denote its two extremes by A and B. Assume AB is divided into an ω-ordered sequence of adjacent intervals (an ω-ordered partition as is usually called) whose first interval begins just at point A. Let C be a point on AB placed at a distance of B far less than Planck distance (10 −33 cm). ω-Order makes it inevitable that between A and C only a finite number of intervals lie, while an infinite number of them (i.e. practically all of them) must necessarily lie between C and B. No matter how close is C from B, between C and B will always be an infinite number of intervals while between A and C only a finite number of them will exist. The same applies to supertasks: if t b if the first instant at which a supertask has been accomplished, then at any instant prior to t b , whatsoever it be, only a finite number of tasks will have been carried out and infinitely many of them must still be performed. There is no way that only a finite number n of tasks remain to be performed simply because they would be the impossible last n tasks of an ω-ordered sequence of tasks 16 . Thus while a supertask be performing only a finite number of tasks will have been performed and an infinite number of them will always remain to be performed. By way of example, imagine that God decides to successively count all natural numbers in its natural order of precedence (which, as St. Augustine believed [2] , He could). Although He has been counting during an eternity and only a time less than Planck time (10 −43 s) remains to finish, He will have counted only a finite number of numbers and practically all of them -infinitely many of them-have still to be counted. Or in other words, while He be counting He will have counted only a finite number of numbers and an infinitude of them remain still to be counted. It is impossible to avoid this huge and unaesthetic asymmetry. As Aristotle claimed, perhaps it is impossible to traverse the untraversable [8] , or to complete the uncompletable.
The criticism of ω-order I have just referred to, analyzes the assumption that it is possible to complete an uncompletable sequence of actions, be them the tasks of a supertask or the definitions of a recursive ω-ordered sequence of definitions. Benacerraf was right in that we cannot infer consequences on the final state of a supermachine from the successive performed actions with that supermachine. But Benacerraf did not consider the consequences of having completed the supertask on the supermachine that performs it. The formal development of this line of argument leads to many contradictions involving ω-order and then the actual infinity. It can be proved, for instance, that, as a consequence of a supertask, the magnetic beads of Hilbert machine are and are not placed in the left side of the machine 17 . None of those arguments have been refuted. Although some recalcitrant infinitists defend arguments so picturesque as for instance that the magnetic beads -in the above example-disappear for reasons unknown; others pretend to invalidate an argument by confronting its conclusions with the conclusions of other arguments with have nothing to do with the original one; or defend the idea that the inconsistencies of ω-order found in supertask theory do not apply to ω-ordered sets. But ω-order is ω-order in all circumstances, and consists of being a complete totality that has a first element (be it the element of a set or the task of a supertask) and such that every element has an immediate successor and an immediate predecessor (except the first one); i.e. a totality that is both complete and uncompletable. To be complete and uncompletable not only seems contradictory, the criticism of ω-order I am referring to, actually proves that is in fact the case.
It is even possible to develop arguments of this type in set theoretical terms. For instance, in each step of the recursive definition of an strictly increasing ω-ordered sequence of finite nested sets, a real variable x is defined as the cardinal of the set just defined at each step. It can then be proved that x is and is not defined as a finite cardinal 18 . We could also consider the set Q + of positive rational numbers and prove a consistency derived from the fact that Q + may be densely ordered (between any two rationals infinitely many other rationals do exist) and ω-ordered (between any two successive rationals no other rational exists). In effect, being Q + denumerable there exists a bijection f between Q + and the set N of natural numbers so that Q + can be written as {f (1), f (2), f (3), . . . }. If x is a rational variable whose initial value is 1, and d i i∈N a sequence of positive rationals, both defined according to:
where | f (i + 1) − f (1) | is the absolute value of f (i + 1) − f (1); and '<' represents the natural order of Q, then it can be proved that f (1) + x is and is not the less rational greater than f (1)
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Criticism of self-reference
The other great obstruction in the history of human thought is selfreference. Also of Presocratic origins (paradoxes of Epimenides and Eubulides) it has been, and continues to be, an inexhaustible source of discussions (see, for instance, [104] , [13] , [81] , [151] , [160] , etc.). To begin, the very term 'self-reference' is equivocal: in all cases there is a sentence or symbol chain referring to itself. But no object has the ability to refer to itself or to other objects, only humans beings have that ability. No sentence nor symbol chain has autonomous existence. Even if they are automatically generated, the engine that generated them is always conceived of and turn on by a human being. In addition, they have no meaning if no human interpret them. They do not symbolize for themselves, they exclusively symbolize for us. So, beyond any sentence or symbol chain there always is a man or a woman trying to say something. Thus, beyond the celebrated liar sentence:
This sentence is false (15) there is a human trying to say something. He exactly says:
This I say is false (16) If in the place of saying (16) our human says This I tread is yellow (17) we would look at his foots and could identify the object he is referring to. But what object is being referred to when he says (16)? As far as I'm concerned, I must recognize I don't know of what I'm predicating its falseness when I say (16) . I even have the impression of be saying nothing when I say (16) . In any case let us consider the following two alternatives regarding the possibilities of the subject whose falseness I predicate when I say (16) . It may be either:
This I say is false (18) or This I say (19) In the first alternative the words 'is' and 'false' have a confusing double syntactic function, the one as a part of the subject of the sentence; the second as the verb (in the case of 'is') or the predicate (in the case of 'false') of the same sentence. But no language exists whose grammar consider the possibility for a term to have two syntactic functions at the same time in the same sentence. This should suffice to rule out the first alternative. In the second alternative the true subject is:
This (20) because the words 'I' and 'say' are to determine a particular (20) , the one I utter when I say (19) . But to say this or that and nothing more is to say nothing. I must therefore conclude that, in fact, I don't know of what I am stating its falseness when I say (16) . And I suspect no one knows it 20 . If that were the case, and taking into account that we, the humans, are its only interprets, to say (16) is to say nothing. And the same applies when I say things as:
This I say is P (21) 20 And that assuming we have previously selected the appropriate theory of true to deals with those declarative sentences, because some dozens of them are available [121] where P is any predicate, for instance: This I say is not C-demonstrable (22) where C is a certain formal calculus. Furthermore, since the subject of a self-referent sentence is the whole sentence, we will not know the subject of the sentence until the whole sentence has been uttered; but at this moment we have already predicated the subject. This is as to count one's chickens before they are hatched. That is in fact the case of the liar paradox and the like 21 , we are saying that something is false before to know of what are we predicating its falseness. This situation resembles the one originated by Russell's Paradox as we will immediately see. Probably our mind processes two times self-referent sentences, the first to state the subject -the referent-and the second to predicate it. If that were the case, self-reference would be only a semantic illusion.
Russell Paradox of the set R of all sets that do not belong to themselves 22 is a set theoretical version of the Liar Paradox. In fact, according to its definition R belongs to itself whenever it does not belong to itself. We are again in the same above situation of trying to count one's chickens before the are hatched. In effect, all elements of a set should have been defined before grouping them as a set. That is the only way to know which elements are we grouping (in the same way we should know the subject of a predicate before we can predicate it). But the set R as element of the set R is not defined until the set R be defined as a set, which in turn is impossible until R be defined as an element. Shortly before Russell discover his famous paradox, Charles Dogson, better known as Lewis Carroll, proposed the following definition of Class: ( [34] , p. 31) :
Classification or the formation of Classes is a Mental Process, in which we imagine that we have put together, in a group, certain things. Such a group is called a "Class". Carroll's proposal is clearly non platonic. Classes are mental constructions, theoretical objects resulting from our mental activity. Carroll's definition could be rewritten as: Definition 1. A set is the theoretical object that results from a mental process of grouping arbitrary objects previously defined.
Constructive Definition 1 is incompatible with self-referent sets because before defining the set, all its elements have to be previously defined -either by enumeration or comprehension. And this excludes the set 21 Self-reference can be ingenuously hidden through a group of sentences that refer to each other in a circular way. 22 Russell discovered his famous paradox when he was analyzing Cantor's paradox on the set of all cardinals [24] , which is also a self-referent set.
being defined, simply because the set cannot be defined as element before it be defined as set; and if it is not previously defined as element it cannot be grouped to form the set. It is remarkable, on the other hand, that constructive Definition 1 is not circular, a mental process of grouping is not a group but a mental process. In addition, it seems reasonable to require that all elements to be grouped be previously defined, particularly if we pretend to know what are we grouping. Being self-referent, Russell's set R is not a set according to Definition 1. And for the same reasons of self-reference neither the set of all cardinals nor the set of all ordinals could be sets according to the same definition. Thus, to assume the above non platonic definition of set suffices to solve Cantor, Burali-Forti and Russell paradoxes. But modern set theories have never considered this non platonic option. Self-reference had finally to be removed from set theory, but by less elegant means as the Axiom of Regularity [120] , [179] , the Theory of Types [143] or the Theory of Classes [17] , [65] .
The removal of self-reference from set theory should serve us to reflex on the future of semantic self-reference. Sets and monadic sentences are more related to each other than it may seem. When we say:
S is P (23) we assert the subject S has the predicate or property P. The elements of a set are as the subject of the above monadic sentence, all them share the same property of membership. A set that belong to itself is as a self-referent sentence: it also states a predicate of itself, in this case its membership to the set, i.e. the membership to itself. Now then, if self-reference is not appropriate for set theory and we had to remove it in order to avoid inconsistencies, why not to remove semantic self-reference from languages?
6. Platonism and biology
Dobzhansky written a famous paper entitled Nothing in Biology Makes
Sense Except in the Light of Evolution [51] . I think it would have been more appropriate to write reproduction in the place of evolution
23
. And not only because evolution is powered by reproduction. Mainly it is because only reproduction explains the extravagances of living being. Living organisms are, in effect, extravagant objects, i.e. objects with properties that cannot be derived from physical laws. To have red feathers, to move by jumping, or to be devored by the female in exchange for copulating with it, are examples (and the list would be 23 Of course, evolution is a natural process and denying it is so stupid as denying photosynthesis or glycolysis. Other different affair is the scientific theory available to explain it. As any other scientific theory, the theory of organic evolution remains unfinished and currently opened to numerous discussions (see for instance [157] , [20] , [162] , [138] , [146] , [102] , [56] , [137] , [36] , [69] , [145] , [35] etc.) interminable) of properties that cannot be derived from physical laws. Living beings are subjected to a biological law that dominates over all physical laws, the Law of Reproduction (reproduce as you might). This law is the only responsible for all past, present and future extravagances of living beings. The success in reproduction depends upon certain characteristics of living beings that frequently have nothing to do with the efficient accomplishment of physical laws but with arbitrary preferences as singing, or dancing, or having brilliant colors. Although, on the other hand, to achieve reproduction is previously necessary to be alive, which in turn involves a lot of abilities related to the particular environment of each living being. But this is in fact secondary: adapted and efficient as an organism may be, if it don't reproduce, its excellence will have no future in the Biosphere.
Living beings are topically viewed as systems efficiently adapted to their environment. No attention is usually payed to its extravagant nature, although extravagance -in the above sense-is undoubtedly its more relevant characteristic. We are the only (known) extravagant systems in the Universe. By the way, these extravagances could only be the result of capricious evolution rather than of intelligent design. Capricious evolution restricted by the physical laws governing the world. One of the latest extravagances appeared on Earth is the consciousness exhibited by some primates and notably by most of humans. Surely, the sensation of individual subjectivity is the responsible for our peculiar way of interpreting our internal symbolic reflex of the world (see below). I refer to Platonism, the belief that ideas do exist independently of the mind that elaborate them and use them in its continuous interaction with the physical world. It is surely a side effect of consciousness that ideas become alive.
Animals must have a symbolic and abstract representation of their natural environments (surely inscribed in some neural networks), particularly of all those objects and processes that may have consequences on their own survival and reproduction. It is a symbolic, abstract knowledge: a leopard has in its mind the (abstract) idea of gazelle, it knows what to do with a gazelle, whatsoever be the particular gazelle it encounters with. The abstract idea of gazelle, and of any other, is elaborated in the brain by means of different components -atoms of knowledge-that not only serve to form the idea of gazelle but of many other abstract ideas. And not only ideas, sensorial perceptions are also elaborated by similar process in atomic and abstract terms, which surely serves to filter the irrelevant details from the highly variable information coming from the physical world, and thus to identify with sufficient security the many objects forming part of the natural environments [177] , [115] . It is, on the other hand, much more efficient and plausible this way of functioning. To have a symbolic representation of every particular object of a natural environment would be inconceivable more complex and expensive from all points of view.
To have an abstract representations of the world is indispensable for animals in order to find the appropriate response to each of the numerous stimuli coming from the highly dynamic world they evolves in. And an error in this affair may cost the higher price. A ball rolling down towards a precipice will not stop to avoid falling down; but the dog running behind it, will do; the dog knows gravity and its consequences. Organisms interact with their surroundings and must know its singularities, its peculiar ways of being and evolving, i.e. its its physical logic, and even its mathematical logic 24 . Organisms need an abstract and symbolic representation of the physical world, and that is not a minor detail. It must therefore be an efficient and precise representation, otherwise life would be impossible. It is through their own actions and experiences, including imitation and innovation [87] , [63] , [139] , [173] , that living beings develop their neurobiological representations (symbolic reflections) of the world. Although genetics is also involved in those cognitive abilities [128] .
Perception and cognition are constructive process in which take part different brain areas, as we are now knowing with certain details [140] , [42] , [156] , [43] . Doubtless, concepts and ideas are mental elaborations rather then transcendent entities we have the ability to contact with. Evolutionary biology and neurobiology are then incompatible with platonism. Our consciousness of ideas together with our recursive thought (an exclusive ability of humans [41] , [79] ) could have promoted the raising and persistence of platonism. But the evolutive and neurobiological fundaments of human cognition suggest that platonic idealism is a wrong way of thinking. If there is a word expressing the essence of the Universe, that word is evolution. And as E. Mayr said Plato is the antihero of evolution [105] . It seems reasonable that Plato were platonic in Plato times, but is certainly surprising the persistence of that primitive way of thinking in the community of contemporary mathematicians, though as could be expected, a certain level of disagreement on this affair also exists [99] , [92] , [100] , [12] . It is remarkable the fact that many non platonic authors, as Wittgenstein, were against both the actual infinity and self-reference [103] .
The reader may come to his own conclusions on the effects the above biological criticism of platonic idealism could have on self-reference and the actual infinity. Although, evidently, he can also maintain that he does not know through neural networks and then to persist in his platonic habits. But for those of us that believe in the organic nature of our brains and in its abilities of perceiving and knowing modeled 24 Primates and humans could dispose of neural networks to deal with numbers [48] , [49] , [79] through more than 3600 millions years of organic evolution, platonism has no longer sense. And neither self-reference nor the actual infinity may survive away from the platonic scenario. On the other hand, it seems convenient to recall the long and conflictive history of both notions (would them have been so conflictive if they were consistent?); and above all their absolute uselessness in order to know the natural world 25 . Physics [153] , [155] and even mathematics [119] , [154] could go without both notions 26 . Experimental sciences as chemistry, biology and geology have never been related to them. The potential infinity probably suffices 27 . Even the number of distinguishable sites in the universe is finite [82] . Finite and discrete: not only matter and energy are discrete entities, space and time could also be of a discrete -quantum-nature as is being suggested from some areas of contemporary physics as superstring theory ( [71] , [72] [167] , [58] ), loop quantum gravity ( [158] , [11] [159]), euclidean quantum gravity ( [6] ), quantum computation ( [164] , [14] , [93] ) or black holes thermodynamics [14] , [164] . Beyond Planck's distance nature seems to loss its physical sense. The continuum spacetime, as self-reference and the actual infinity, could only be a uselessness rhetorical device. The reader can finally imagine the enormous simplification of mathematics once liberated from infinity and self-reference (Ockham Razor agitates within its box).
Appendix A. An inconsistency in the field of rational numbers
As in modern physics with superstring theory [88] , [95] , the actual infinity in contemporary mathematics plays such a dominant role that it almost impossible to maintain a critical attitude (perhaps another sociological version of the so called Principle of St. Matthew [111] ). But the actual infinity is an inconsistent notion and soon or later the nightmare will finally end, as Poincaré and Wittgenstein, among others, announced. Along the last twelve years, and motivated by supertask theory, I could develop several arguments against the actual infinity based on the notion of ω-order, an inevitable consequence (as Cantor himself proved [31]) of assuming the existence of actual infinite totalities. To be ω-ordered means to be complete (as the actual infinity requires) and uncompletable (because no last element completes ω-ordered sequences). To be complete and uncompletable is not only apparently contradictory, it is an actual contradiction 28 . The following short argument has nothing to do with this line of reasoning, although it is based on another schizophrenic ability of the actual infinity; in this case the ability of the set of rational numbers of being both densely ordered (between any two rationals infinitely many other rationals do exist) and ω-ordered (between any two successive rationals no other rational exists).
As Cantor did 29 [30], we will also assume the existence of the set of all finite cardinals as a complete totality (axiom of infinity in modern terms). The discussion that follows will be entirely based upon that assumption. In those conditions, consider the field of rational numbers with its usual operations and ordering. As is well known, Cantor successfully proved the set Q of rationals is denumerable [26] , and so it is the set Q + of positive rationals. In consequence, there exists a one to one correspondence f between the set N of natural numbers and Q + . We can then write:
In this way, bijection f induces a new ω-ordering in Q + . Consider now a positive rational variable x whose initial value is 1, and a sequence of positive rationals d i i∈N , both defined in accordance with:
where | f (i + 1) − f (1) | is the absolute value of f (i + 1) − f (1); and '<' stands for the usual ordering of Q; i.e d 1 < x means x − d i > 0. Infinitist procedures as (25) are common in infinitist mathematics. Cantor himself used them in the demonstrations of some of his most relevant infinitist conclusions (for instance in his two celebrated proofs on the uncountable nature of the set R of real numbers [26] , [27] [29] ). In our case, and being Q closed with respect to addition and substraction, definition (25) defines the sequence d i i∈N as a complete infinite totality of positive rationals. But it also redefines rational variable x whenever the term just defined be less than its current value. Notice we have make used of both ω-order (< ω ) and Q dense order (<). The first to define the successive terms of d i i∈N ; the second to redefine variable x. We are now in the appropriate position to prove the following two contradictory results: Proposition 1. f (1) + x is the less rational greater than f (1) in the usual ordering of Q + .
Proof. Being Q + closed with respect to addition, it is clear that f (1)+x is a positive rational number. Assume that it is not the less rational greater than f (1). In this case there will be a positive rational f (n) such that f (n) − f (1) < x. But this is impossible because
just from the definition of d n−1 on. f (1)+x is therefore the less rational greater than f (1) in the usual ordering of Q + .
Proposition 2. f (1) + x is not the less rational greater than f (1) in the usual ordering of Q + .
Proof. The rational f (1) + x × 10 −1 is evidently grater than f (1) and less than f (1) + x. Therefore, the rational f (1) + x is not the less rational greater than f (1) in the usual ordering of Q + .
We have therefore derived a contradiction from our initial assumption, the Axiom of Infinity, that legitimates the existence of complete infinite totalities, the only ones that can be ω-ordered and densely ordered. From the perspective of the potential infinity, on the other hand, only finite totalities can be considered, and finite totalities cannot be neither ω-ordered nor densely ordered. Thus no contradiction arises from this perspective. It is significant that while the history of infinite sets is marked out by a lot of contradictions that could only be avoided either by stating ad hoc differences between finite and infinite numbers or by axiomatic parching set theories, neither paradoxes nor contradictions are known in the case of finite sets.
Appendix B. Reinterpreting the paradoxes of reflexivity
The formal strategy of pairing off the elements of two sets is more ancient than it is usually recognized. In fact, Aristotle used it to reject Zeno's Dichotomies [9] . And since then, the same strategy has been used by many authors with different discursive purposes, almost always related to infinity (Proclus, J. Filopón, Thabit ibn Qurra al-Harani, R. Grosseteste, G. de Rimini, Duns Scotus, G. de Ockham, Galileo etc. [149] ). But none of those authors, including Bolzano, rejected the Euclidean Axiom of the Whole and the Part 30 . Things began to change with Dedekind, who assumed the violation of the old Euclidean axiom and stated the definition of infinite sets based just on that violation: a set is infinite if it can be put into a one to one correspondence with one of its proper subsets [47] . Dedekind and Cantor inaugurated the so called paradise of the actual infinity, where exhaustive injections (bijections or one to one correspondences) play a capital role. The absolute dominance of infinitism in contemporary mathematics and the practical absence of contestation perhaps explain some things otherwise unexplainable. In fact, in the short discussion that follows we will have the occasion to discover a really uncomfortable situation related to the violation of the Axiom of the Whole and the Part. In the core of our discussion will be two functional definitions contending with the number of elements (power or cardinality) of two different sets. I refer to the two following ones: Or in other words, if after pairing every element of a set with a different element of other set all elements of this last set result paired (exhaustive injection) then both sets have the same number of elements. Otherwise, if at least one element of the last set results unpaired (non-exhaustive injection) then both sets have not the same number of elements. While Definition 2 is fundamental in transfinite set theory, Definition 3 is usually ignored, although both definitions are complementary; and the way of comparing the number of elements in both definition is similar: if after pairing every element of a set B with a different element of set A, one or more elements of A remains unpaired then A and B have not the same number of elements. This seems so reasonable as to say that if after pairing every element of B with a different element of A, no elements of A remains unpaired then A and B have the same number of elements. Thus, being both definitions of the same level of basic reasoning 31 and having the same reasonable credibility, we should assume that both exhaustive and non exhaustive injections have the same level of conclusiveness when used as instruments to compare the number of elements of two finite or infinite sets (from now on this assumption will be referred to as A1).
There is no reason (except reasons of convenience) to reject A1. Suppose then we assume it. In this case, consider any infinite set A. By definition, at least a proper subset B of A exists such that both sets can be put into a one to one correspondence, and then both sets have the same number of elements (Definition 2). But it also exists a nonexhaustive injection f from B to A defined as: From the infinitist perspective the paradoxes of reflexivity (all those in which a whole is put into a one to one correspondence with one of its proper parts 32 ) are usually interpreted as side effects resulting from the supposed singularities of the actual infinity. Infinity is different, is monotonously claimed 33 . The reasonability of A1 suggests, however, a new interpretation of those paradoxes: that rather than paradoxes they are true contradictions. Contradictions derived from the inconsistency of the actual infinity. It is the actual infinity, in fact, that makes it possible that two sets, as A and B, can be put into injective correspondences that may be exhaustive and non exhaustive. This is a clear indicator of inconsistency. Unless we explain the reason for which A and B have the same number of elements in spite of the fact that after having paired each element of B with a different element of A, at leats one element of A remains unpaired. And the reason cannot be the exhaustive injection (bijection) between A and B just because it could be the case that the non-exhaustive injection between both sets be so legitimate and conclusive as the exhaustive one (A1). If we were faced with a contradiction we could not use one of the contradictory conclusions to arbitrarily deny the other.
There is a long tradition in the history of human thought, particularly in formal sciences, that consists in taking as paradoxes what really 31 Transfinite arithmetic will be later derived from this basic initial assumptions and then we will get results as ℵ 0 + n = ℵ 0 ; ℵ n 0 = ℵ 0 and the like, where n is a finite cardinal or natural number. Evidently those results cannot be used to state the convenience or inconvenience of Definition 3, otherwise we will making use of a circular reasoning 32 Galileo Paradox [61] is a well known example of this type of paradox. 33 So different that it could be inconsistent.
are contradictions. And this has surely contributed to increase the confusion on certain notions as the actual infinity. In our case, we must decide whether exhaustive and non-exhaustive injections have or not the same level of conclusiveness when used as instruments to compare the number of elements of two infinite sets. If we decide they have the same level of conclusiveness, then the actual infinity is an inconsistent notion (infinite sets have and do not have the same number of elements of some of its proper subsets). Otherwise we should explicitly declare, by the appropriate ad hoc axiom, that the number of elements of infinite sets cannot be compared by means of non-exhaustive injections.
